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Abstract 
 
Cropping choices under uncertainty caused by weather, input prices, and ecological conditions 
have been addressed in contemporary literature. However, uncertainty arising from violent 
conflict on farming choices lacks substantial academic attention. In this research we address the 
ramifications of conflict on household cropping choices, building on the notion of “conflict 
resistant” cropping systems introduced in Kibriya et al. 2014 and King et al. 2013. We argue that 
farming households’ preferences change under conflict as they revert to a cropping system that 
minimizes losses. This novel concept is solidified by formulating a definition through rational 
choice theory. The theoretical expectations are verified through data obtained from 2300 
smallholder farming households in North Kivu, DRC. A case study and propensity score 
matching methods are employed to demonstrate that conflict-affected households focus more on 
low-value crops that are less frequently stolen in order to maximize the probability of survival. 
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Introduction 
 
Researchers have considered how farmers choose crops to hedge against uncertainty caused by 
weather and prices (e.g. Dercon 1996; and Morduch 1990). Few studies have extended the 
analysis to uncertainty arising from conflict. Most of the existing literature on violent conflict 
either addresses ecological (Gillingham et al. 2003;  Hocking et al. 2012; and Hill 2000) or 
human security (Barnett et al. 2007 and Hussein et al. 1997) issues.  In case studies by Kibriya et 
al. (2014), King et al. (2013), and Price et al. (2014), a number of crops and cropping systems 
were identified as ‘conflict resistant’—a term which implies that these crops are less likely to be 
impacted adversely by conflict (e.g. through theft, destruction, underproduction, lack of markets, 
etc.). The work suggested the value of a deeper understanding of farmer crop choices with 
respect to the threat of conflict. Information from farmers about conflict resistant crops and 
cropping systems can guide extension workers to improve food security in conflict regimes, and 
guide scientists and policy makers to direct research that improves the conflict resistance of 
crops and cropping systems or the viability of crops already identified as such. Along the 
following lines, we investigate the influence of violent conflict on farmers’ crop choices in DRC. 
We argue that farming households’ preferences shift under conflict as they revert to a conflict 
resilient cropping system. We solidify the novel concept of conflict resistant cropping choices 
and systems by defining it through rational choice theory. Following, we verify our theoretical 
expectations through a case study and quantitative analysis of a household survey. Our 
regression results are verified through a propensity score matching method that conclusively 
shows that cropping choices of conflict-affected households focus more on low value yet high-
security products that maximize the probability of survival. 
 
Literature Review and Discussion of Definitions 
 
Although commonly practiced through much of the developing world, the concept of conflict-
resistant cropping choices is relatively novel in academia. “War resistant” crops were discussed 
in Zilverberg’s 2007 MS thesis on “Agriculture, Technology, and Conflict,” based on his field 
research in post-conflict Santa Cruz del Quiché, Guatemala. He noted that during times of war, 
farming households’ cropping choices are altered to produce crops that are difficult to be 
destroyed and can be cultivated without much risk (Zilverberg 2007). 
 
Price observed during fieldwork in DR Congo in 2014 that food acquisition from farmers by 
guerilla fighters and the regular military occurs in several ways. Fighters typically roam in small 
groups and may steal clandestinely or at gunpoint.  Larger groups may requisition food from 
village leaders, or order the community to vacate their farms or homes at harvest time so that 
their crops might be taken.  Other groups purchase food but conduct roadblocks or extortion at 
mining sites. “Conflict resistant” crops are those crops that provide the best return to the farmer 
under such conditions. More generally, they are crops which best support bare-minimum food 
security in households that are exposed to armed conflict. 
 
Existing literature on cropping decisions under conflict in North Kivu is limited, but Vlassenroot 
and Raeymaekers have touched on the subject in extensive work on the history and political 
economy of eastern DRC. They note for example that in Masisi, North Kivu, during conflict 
farmers’ crop choices demonstrate “a significant shift from extensive to intensive cultivation and 
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from perennial crops to low-risk and seasonal crops” (Vlassenroot 2008). In this context, they 
describe agricultural decision-making as “increasingly guided by the minimizing of risk rather 
than the maximizing of profits. In addition, the diversification of crops [is] in accordance with 
tenure security, which explain[s] the reduction of perennial crops” (Vlassenroot 2008). They go 
on to note that the disappearance of local support structures which “assist and guide local 
farmers” (e.g. agronomists) has further negative impacts on farmers’ production and their ability 
to survive on the basis of their agricultural success.1 
 
Among the few instances in the literature where farmer decision-making under conditions of 
conflict is quantified, Rockmore (2014) uses a large dataset from northern Uganda to examine 
cropping and livestock holdings. He shows that in areas where rebel activity is reported, farmers 
keep less livestock, with a more pronounced negative effect on large animal holdings (i.e. cows) 
and a potentially positive effect on pig holdings. He also finds that in areas with rebel activity, 
fewer households choose to cultivate cassava, beans, and maize, while more households cultivate 
millet. 
 
Previous work by Kibriya, Partida, King, Price (2012) has laid out a set of crop characteristics 
which are associated with conflict-resistance. Building upon their work, conflict resistance can 
be conveyed through a combination of several different properties, including (1) low visibility, 
(2) harvesting or transport difficulty for looters, (3) production in home gardens or infields as 
opposed to outfields (4) extensive processing requirements, (5) quick damage recovery, (6) 
continual production, (7) market complexity, and (8) annual (vs. perennial) growth pattern. 
Farming households under conflict will tend to forgo crops that are of high nutritional value and 
are easily marketable, and choose instead to cultivate crops with some combination of these 
characteristics. Thus we offer a definition of a ‘conflict-resistant cropping system’ as the 
cultivation of a set of crops with some combination of the above characteristics, on the part of a 
smallholder in response to conditions of widespread active civil conflict. 
 
Hypotheses 
 
The primary objective of this study is to explore the conditions (i.e. the specific categories of 
conflict) under which crop theft in particular occurs, and how farmers’ choices of crops are 
influenced by the incidence of conflict. We also aim to further clarify attributes that impart 
conflict resistance to crops and cropping systems. A secondary objective is to learn what factors 
might moderate the effects of conflict on crop choice, such as ease of converting crops to cash 
through market access. Standard choice theory2 infers that farming households’ will alter their 
                                                          
1 See Rockmore 2014 for a particularly extensive review of the literature on agricultural decision-making and 
exposure to insecurity and violence. 
2 Standard rational choice theory suggests that individuals have preferences among the available choice alternatives 
that allow them to state which option they prefer. These preferences are based on three axioms: a. completeness (the 
agent can always say which of two alternatives they consider preferable or that neither is preferred to the other); b. 
transitive (if option X is preferred over option Y and option Y is preferred over option Z, then X will always be 
preferred over Z); c. consistency (the agent will follow the same pattern/rationality unless the underlying conditions 
change). In this research a rational farmer is assumed to take account of available information, probabilities of 
conflict events, and potential costs and benefits in determining their cropping choices, and act consistently. 
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cropping behavior due to exposure to violent conflict. This behavior is likely to be facilitated 
through market access3 and technology.4 Our main hypotheses in this study are: 
 
H1: Conflict-affected farming households revert to conflict-resistant cropping systems.   
 
H2: Farmers who have better access to markets and technology will be more equipped to 
practice a conflict-resistant cropping system. 
 
Survey and Sampling Methodology 
 
Data for this study was collected from North Kivu, DRC in August and September of 2014.5 We 
randomly chose thirty-six villages from Beni, Lubero and Rushuru regions of North Kivu6 using 
a randomized grid-based strategy and interviewed approximately 2200 rural farming households. 
The sampling methodology was designed to ensure each village in the selected regions has equal 
selection likelihood.  High-resolution maps from the United Nation’s Office for the Coordination 
of Humanitarian Affairs identify villages in each region. For the grid-based sampling 
methodology, each region was divided into 5kmx5km squares. In order to be included in the 
sample space, a grid square had to have at least one village in it. We identified 626 populated 
squares in the three territories considered, and numbered those squares consecutively—Beni 
1:190, Lubero 191:462, and Rutshuru 463:626.  Gridding methodology is appropriate because 
population density is not known and cannot be incorporated in the sampling procedure. 
 
R statistical software was used to generate sixty-five random numbers to select squares for 
village sampling.7 Squares that could not be surveyed due to geographic, safety or other concerns 
are replaced with the next number. Village selection uses proportional weighting within each 
square. One village was chosen at random from each grid square selected. The unit of analysis is 
the individual farming household.  Each household in the selected villages was surveyed, 
whenever possible.  Enumerators were instructed to ask for the individual responsible for 
farming.  If the individual is not available, enumerators proceed to the next house and return 
later. 
 
The surveyor was prepared to gather specific information on household demography, input 
availability and usage, crop choices, market access, empowerment and social voice, and conflict 
within the society. The main dependent variable for this research is the cropping system of farming 
households. To collect specific information on the household cropping system the surveyor 
gathered detailed information on the types of crops each household chose and the reasoning behind 
such choices. Households were asked to categorize between crops grown for home consumption 
and cash crops. Additionally, they were asked to specify which crops they had ever had stolen 
                                                          
3 Market access in this specific study refers to be able to access local enterprises to buy or sell crops and inputs. It 
encompasses communication facilities such as: cell phones, radio, cycles and social cohesion such as: NGO and co-
operative assistance. 
4 For this study technology refers to seeds, fertilizer, irrigation facilities, pesticides and herbicides available to 
farming households. 
5 The survey was validated and approved by the Institutional Review Board.   
6 Safety and logistical considerations eliminated the other territories in North Kivu from initial consideration. 
7 R 10.3 for Mac Maverick, seed set to 2301.  The numbers were selected without replacement. 
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from their fields, and which crops they had never had stolen from their fields. Given the regions 
and villages the households belonged in, we also asked questions on ethnicity and recorded data on 
the administrative unit (groupement) in which the household was located. Market access was 
determined by their access to credit and local trade. Information on empowerment and social 
cohesion were acquired through households’ connection to village leadership and extent and type 
of interaction with fellow farmers. We also gathered information on their co-operative membership 
status and whether they had any contracts with a crop buyer enterprise. 
 
Empirical Strategy 
 
We initiate our analysis through a qualitative understanding of the farming households in the 
three surveyed regions of North Kivu and a quantitative estimation of their choices. These 
choices are set within the agroecological and sociopolitical context of each territory. We then 
explore the prevalence of both conflict and crop theft in each region, including discussion of the 
correlations between the incidence of each. The first section concludes by illustrating our 
hypothesis that farmers shift away from high-conflict crops and toward more conflict-resistant 
crops when local insecurity increases. 
 
In the second section of the empirical study, we focus on a short case study of a subset of the 
surveyed regions of North Kivu, which introduces and illustrates our quantitative analysis. In the 
case study, we discuss the agronomic and ecological attributes of specific crops and cropping 
patterns of the geographical areas in question. The case study also reveals and verifies the 
choices adopted by farmers by examining the prevalence of conflict and cultivation of different 
crops in segregated survey areas. While the initial T-tests and the regression and PSM analysis in 
Section Three provide a measurable understanding of patterns, the case study aims to provide a 
more intuitive explanation of farmer choices. 
 
In the third section, we perform a regression analysis that will quantify the consequence of 
conflict on cropping system choice. Given the cross-sectional nature of our dataset, we cannot 
control for unobserved heterogeneity within households, nor can we find a suitable and valid 
instrument that would be partially correlated with our explanatory variables, but uncorrelated 
with unobserved heterogeneity. To mitigate any bias this might introduce and in order to capture 
at least some heterogeneity across groups of households, we include ethnic and groupement fixed 
effects instead and estimate the following equation: 
 (1) 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐_𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝛼𝛼 +  𝛽𝛽1 𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝛽𝛽2 𝑔𝑔𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔𝑜𝑜𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖 + 𝑿𝑿′𝛽𝛽3 +  𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖      
 
Where  crop_choiceij refers to the cropping decision of household i belonging to groupement j; 
for the groupement fixed effect. For this estimation we divided the cropping choices into three 
groups: a. conflict resistant food crops; b. conflict resistant cash crops and c. crop diversification. 
The conflict resistant food and cash crops refer to each household’s responses on the crops they 
deemed most unlikely to be stolen and their propensity to produce them. The crop diversity 
variable is derived from the number of crops individual households chose to produce. X is a 
vector of the mentioned control variables, referring to: conflict incidence, education, income, 
social cohesion, access to technology, co-operative membership and access to market. εij refers 
to the innovation term. In all regressions, we used robust standard errors. Since the dependent 
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variable is categorical and ordinal, an ordered probit model was used to estimate the main 
equation. 
 
While the randomly selected population and categorical regression analysis may eliminate bias, 
the incidence of conflict or crop choice may be correlated with the other variables which we 
consider controls. A randomized controlled trial would be ideal but impossible to implement 
since “conflict” cannot be inserted as a treatment. In this situation, the best empirical setup will 
be a quasi-experimental design. OLS estimations may produce overestimates of the impact of 
conflict on crop choices. Overestimation of the effects may occur because many attributes that 
create conflict may be the same characteristics that do not allow farmers to cultivate certain 
crops. Therefore, we also chose to employ Propensity Score Matching (PSM) to isolate the effect 
of conflict on different cropping choices. 
 
Matching methods group and match individual observations based on a single variable (Dehejia 
and Wahba 1999; Dehejia and Wahba 2002). By matching pairs of farming households with the 
same characteristics from control and treatment groups, we can make a comparison between 
treatment and control groups while reducing selection bias. For our quasi-experimental 
estimation, we use PSM as proposed by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983). PSM refers to the 
conditional probability (given a vector of covariates X) of being assigned to treatment. 
Propensity score accounts for the multidimensional covariates and compresses them into a single 
dimension, facilitating the matching process (Abadie and Imbens 2009). Hence, the key 
advantage of PSM is that by using a linear combination of covariates for a single score, it 
balances treatment and control groups on a large number of covariates without losing a large 
number of observations. The pair-matched individuals in control and treatment groups with the 
same propensity score are essentially comparable since their only difference is whether they have 
been assigned to the treatment or the control group. 
 
More intuitively, a propensity score is the probability of a unit (i.e., farming household choosing 
crops that are conflict resistant) being assigned to a particular treatment (i.e., experiencing 
conflict), given a set of observed variables, such as household demographics and access to 
different facilities. Propensity scores reduce selection bias by equating groups based on the 
selected variables. In the case of a binary treatment T (T=1 if experienced conflict, and 0 
otherwise), an outcome Y (specific cropping choices), and background variables X, the 
propensity score is defined as the conditional probability of treatment given background 
variables. The treatment assignment is, then, (conditionally) unconfounded if potential outcomes 
are not dependent on the treatment, conditional on background variables. In technical terms, we 
obtain the average treatment effect (ATE) as the mean difference in outcome between the treated 
and the control households, and the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) which is the 
average effect from treatment for those who actually experienced conflict. To check the 
robustness of the PSM estimation, several matching algorithms are implemented: nearest 
neighbor, radius (‘caliper’), and kernel (Caliendo and Kopeining 2008; Imbens 2015). 
 
In the nearest neighbor matching method, each conflict-affected household is matched with a 
conflict-free household with the closest propensity score. The propensity score is the probability 
of a household experiencing conflict given a set of specified control variables. The radius 
approach matches each conflict-affected household with all non-conflict-affected households 
whose propensity score falls in a predefined neighborhood. In kernel matching, each conflict-
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affected household is matched with a weighted average of all conflict-free households, with 
weights declining with the distance between propensity scores. 
 
Results– Part I 
 
There is considerable agroecological and sociopolitical heterogeneity across the province of 
North Kivu, though individual territories can be characterized as somewhat unique from each 
other. The eastern reaches of all three territories considered are endowed with rich soil (with 
volcanic derivatives in the south and young fertile Mollisols in the north), while the low-altitude 
western regions have more acidic and nutrient-poor soils. Three staple crops, beans, cassava, and 
maize, are the most commonly cultivated crops across all three territories, though they are 
present in varying relative proportions across the territories (See Table 2). 
 
Beni territory is lower-altitude than the other two territories (generally less than 1200m), with 
localized rebel activity which increased significantly in the period immediately following the 
completion of the fieldwork for this study. Households grow more bananas than either of the 
other territories considered, along with cocoa, coffee and oil palm as cash crops. The territory is 
relatively ethnically homogenous, being populated largely by the Nande ethnic group. 
 
Lubero territory is generally high-altitude (above 1200m - though the sparsely-populated western 
expanse of the territory is found at a lower altitude), and also has localized rebel activity, 
primarily in the southern region. In addition to the primary three staple crops, farmers grow rice, 
vegetables and a significant amount of potatoes. The territory is very ethnically homogenous, 
with the city of Butembo along the northern border of the territory being recognized as a 
traditional Nande stronghold. 
 
Rutshuru territory is a mix of middle and higher altitudes, and has much more widespread rebel 
activity than either of the northern territories, in large part due to an influx of refugees and armed 
groups following the genocide in Rwanda in 1994, along with a complicated history of 
population flows from neighboring regions dating back at least to the Belgian colonial era. In 
addition to the three staple crops, farmers grow soy, sorghum, fruits and vegetables. The territory 
is ethnically diverse, with a mix comprising primarily the Hutu, Nande and Tutsi ethnic groups. 
 
Over the past five years conflict has generally spread northward from Rutshuru territory. 8 
Among the many armed groups active in the province, the FDLR are particularly significant. An 
ethnically Hutu militia previously localized to Rutshuru territory, the FDLR’s activities have 
spread into southern Lubero and possibly further north. A variety of ethnically Nande local 
defense groups have sprung up in the areas where the FDLR is active. 
                                                          
8 The many layers of conflict in the eastern provinces of the Democratic Republic of Congo are complex and rooted 
in a combination of historical, political, ethnic and geographical factors which lie beyond the scope of this paper. 
For an in-depth historical perspective see Hochschild 1999; for a nuanced discussion of recent events see Stearns 
2012. 
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Table 1. Prevalence of conflict per territory 
Prevalence of Beni Lubero Rutshuru “Sub-Region 12” 
Community-level conflict 19.8% 22.6% 27.8% 42.5% 
Conflict attributed to rebel groups 6.6% 5.1% 11.4% 27.6% 
(Correlation coefficient) 0.046 0.240     0.178  0.289 
 
Table 2. Prevalence of crop cultivation per territory 
Prevalence of Cultivation Beni Lubero Rutshuru “Sub-Region 12” 
Bananas 55.1% 30.4% 37.8% 4.7% 
Beans 85.6% 64.3% 78.8% 52.0% 
Cassava 85.3% 70.8% 76.3% 59.1% 
Maize 80.0% 68.4% 83.1% 59.1% 
 
Of the twenty-nine crops covered in the survey, only four registered consistently high rates of 
theft across all regions surveyed: maize, beans, cassava and bananas (See Table 3).9 On average, 
theft is substantially more common in Rutshuru territory as compared to Beni or Lubero 
territories, though maize theft is relatively high everywhere. 
 
Conflict is categorized as “community-level”, reported either as conflict with neighbors or 
family members or “attributed to rebel groups.” (See Table 1) In Beni territory, conflict and theft 
are both low and unpredictable: community-level conflict is not highly correlated with rebel 
activity, and no conflict is consistently correlated with crop theft (See Table 4). In Lubero, 
conflict and theft are both relatively localized in the southern sub-region, and there is a high level 
of correlation between different kinds of conflict, and between conflict and theft across all crops 
(except bananas, which are not common in Lubero) (See Table 5). In Rutshuru, conflict and theft 
are both more widespread and generally correlated with each other. (See Table 6). 
 
Table 3. Prevalence of crop theft per territory 
Prevalence of Theft: Beni Lubero Rutshuru “Sub-Region 12” 
Bananas 17.2% 10.7% 37.8% 4.7% 
Beans 15.4% 17.2% 78.8% 54.3% 
Cassava 19.1% 15.9% 76.3% 32.3% 
Maize 35.5% 45.8% 83.1% 77.2% 
 
  
                                                          
9 Defined as greater than 10% of households overall reporting theft of the crop at any point. Note that ‘bananas’ 
includes both plantain (more prevalent) and sweet bananas. 
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Table 4. Test statistics for mean rates of theft by incidence of conflict (Beni Territory) 
Beni Territory Bananas Beans Cassava Maize 
Community-level conflict -9.3209*** 2.3523 0.9215 0.7972 
Conflict attributed to rebel groups -1.7270* 1.2547 -3.3226*** -0.0028 
N 679 679 679 679 
Note. Test statistics are reported for the mean rate of theft for each crop for households not reporting the specified 
type of conflict as compared with the mean rate of theft for that crop for households who do report the specified 
type of conflict. *Refers to 10% significance level while ** and *** refer to significance levels of 5 and 1 percent, 
respectively.  
 
Table 5. Test statistics for mean rates of theft by incidence of conflict (Lubero Territory) 
Lubero Territory Bananas Beans Cassava Maize 
Community-level conflict -1.7563* -6.3762*** -2.9170*** -2.6656*** 
Conflict attributed to rebel groups 1.1159 -8.7130*** -4.0566*** -2.0812** 
N 679 679 679 679 
Note. Test statistics are reported for the mean rate of theft for each crop for households not reporting the 
specified type of conflict as compared with the mean rate of theft for that crop for households who do report the 
specified type of conflict. *Refers to 10% significance level while ** and *** refer to significance levels of 5 
and 1 percent, respectively.  
 
Table 6. Test statistics for mean rates of theft by incidence of conflict (Rutshuru Territory) 
Rutshuru Territory Bananas Beans Cassava Maize 
Community-level conflict 1.4503 -3.4542*** -3.9476*** -3.7789*** 
Conflict attributed to rebel groups 1.8929 -3.2135*** 0.3442 0.5043 
N 894 894 894 894 
Note. Test statistics are reported for the mean rate of theft for each crop for households not reporting the specified 
type of conflict as compared with the mean rate of theft for that crop for households who do report the specified 
type of conflict. *Refers to 10% significance level while ** and *** refer to significance levels of 5 and 1 
percent, respectively.  
 
Tables 7 and 8 provide further emphasis for the point that conflict of both categories across 
North Kivu as a whole is correlated with higher rates of crop theft. Table 7, in particular, 
indicates that higher rates of community-level conflict are correlated with increased crop theft in 
beans, cassava, and maize. 
 
Banana theft is difficult to assess in part because the crop is not cultivated as widely, so the 
comparison between territories is difficult. In addition, the banana plant has a number of 
characteristics which confer some degree of conflict-resistance (as defined at the beginning of 
this paper), potentially confounding analysis which treats it as a conflict-prone crop. Those 
characteristics include the fact that the banana corm continues to produce new stalks and new 
bunches even if the farmer is dislocated due to conflict; the relative difficulty in transporting the 
fruit when harvested (given its bulky nature); and the fact that a farmer’s banana field is often 
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near the homestead. As a result, the analysis that follows does not explicitly categorize bananas 
as either conflict-resistant or conflict-prone. (Cf. beans, cassava, and maize, which are all 
categorized as conflict-prone.) 
 
Table 7. Test statistics (and significance) comparing community-level conflict to theft 
Incidence of Community -
Level Conflict 
Theft of: 
Bananas Beans Cassava Maize 
Household level 
(incidence vs. no incidence) 
-4.8284*** -5.3351*** -4.7456*** -4.1990*** 
Sub-regional level 
(20-40% vs. <20%) 
0.9404 5.7629 7.4434 5.4317 
Sub-regional level 
(41-60% vs. <20%) 
-9.2244*** -1.511 -2.3398** -2.8087*** 
Sub-regional level 
(61-80% vs. <20%) 
1.2880 -7.0820*** -8.7767*** -4.9856*** 
Test statistics are reported for the mean rate of theft for each crop for households for the conflict incidence 
comparison specified. “Household level” is identical to the t-test run in Tables 4–6. “Sub-regional level” 
describes the overall percentage of households in an individual survey location which report community-level 
conflict, and compares mean theft in areas with the prevalence rates specified. Note.* refers to 10% significance 
level while ** and *** refer to significance levels of 5 and 1 percent, respectively.  
 
Table 8. Test statistics (and significance) comparing rebel conflict to theft 
Incidence of Conflict  
Attributed to Rebel Groups 
Theft of: 
Bananas Beans Cassava Maize 
Household level 
(incidence vs. no incidence) 
0.8459 -6.4475*** -4.0148*** -1.9883** 
Sub-regional level 
(20-40% vs. <20%) 
3.1510 -11.6012*** -5.6008*** -4.0334*** 
Sub-regional level 
(41-60% vs. <20%) 
0.2498 -3.7996*** -7.6261*** -2.5378** 
Note. Test statistics are reported for the mean rate of theft for each crop for households for the conflict incidence 
comparison specified. “Household level” is identical to the t-test run in Tables 4–6. “Sub-regional level” describes 
the overall percentage of households in an individual survey location which report conflict attributable to rebel 
activities, and compares mean theft in areas with the prevalence rates specified. *Refers to 10% significance level 
while ** and *** refer to significance levels of 5 and 1 percent, respectively.  
 
Case Study 
 
In mid-April, 2012 parts of Lubero territory started to come under control of the FDLR (Van 
Damme 2012; see Raeymaekers 2008 for background). This control was localized in the area just 
south of “Sub-Region 12”, around the town of Luofu in southwestern Lubero territory. This area 
is otherwise substantially similar to the rest of the heavily-populated eastern portion of Lubero 
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territory, with similar rainfall (in the range of 1,200–1,800 mm/yr), altitude (1,600–2,000 m), 
history, market access and ethnic composition. This basic similarity allows us to assess the 
current conditions (post-FDLR incursion) as a natural experiment, in which the rest of eastern 
Lubero territory (substantially unaffected by the incursion) is taken as a control region. 
 
The uptick in rebel-related and another conflict in Sub-Region 12 is evident in respondents’ 
answers to questions about their experience of conflict in the past 12 months (as of August 2014) 
(summarized in Table 9). We also see a particularly high incidence of theft10 in this Sub-Region 
in comparison to the rest of Lubero territory (see Table 11). Upon further inspection, we note 
evidence of changing preferences among farmers with regard to crop choice: Across eastern 
Lubero territory, maize (Zea mays), beans (Phaseolus vulgaris) and cassava (Manihot esculenta) 
are the most commonly cultivated crops, but fewer farmers in Sub-Region 12 choose to cultivate 
maize, beans, and cassava, and more cultivate finger millet (Eleusine coracana), taro (Colocasia 
esculenta) and peas (Pisum sativum) (see Table 10).  
 
Table 9. Prevalence of conflict by source, in Sub-Region 12 vs. Control Region 
Prevalence of Conflict 
(by source) 
Family and 
Neighbors 
Local 
Chiefs 
Government 
Forces 
Rebel  
Groups 
Sub-region 12 42.5% 42.5% 6.3% 27.6% 
Eastern Lubero Territory 20.3% 20.8% 0.8% 0.0% 
test statistic -5.050*** -4.896*** -3.669*** -11.840*** 
N 497 497 497 497 
Note. Test statistics are reported comparing the prevalence of conflict for households between the regions specified. 
*Refers to 10% significance level while ** and *** refer to significance levels of 5 and 1 percent, respectively.  
 
Table 10.  Prevalence of cultivation by crop, in Sub-Region 12 vs. Control Region 
Prevalence of 
Cultivation Beans Cassava Maize Millet 
 
Taro 
 
Peas 
Sub-Region 12 52.0% 59.1% 59.1% 37.0% 49.6% 26.8% 
Eastern Lubero 
Territory 
67.8% 67.8% 65.1% 0.3% 36.2%  3.8% 
test statistic 3.238*** 1.799** 1.228 -14.367*** -2.676*** -8.029*** 
N 497 497 497 497 497 497 
Note. Test statistics are reported comparing the rate of theft for each crop for households between the regions 
specified. *Refers to 10% significance level while ** and *** refer to significance levels of 5 and 1 percent, 
respectively. 
  
                                                          
10 Note that the prevalence of crop theft is higher than the prevalence of cultivation in some cases. Farmers were 
asked to specify which crops they cultivated in the previous two growing seasons (approximately 12 months), but 
the question about theft asked farmers to list crops which had ever been stolen from their fields. 
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Table 11. Prevalence of theft by crop, in Sub-Region 12 vs. Control Region 
Prevalence of Theft Beans Cassava Maize Millet Taro Peas 
Sub-Region 12 54.3% 32.3% 77.2%   0.0% 0.5% 0.8% 
Eastern Lubero Territory 12.2% 13.8% 40.0% 0.0% 0.4% 0.3% 
test statistic -10.824*** -4.725***  -7.625*** – -0.613 -0.793 
N 497 497 497 497 497 497 
Note. Test statistics are reported comparing the rate of theft for each crop for households between the regions 
specified. *Refers to 10% significance level while ** and *** refer to significance levels of 5 and 1 percent, 
respectively. 
 
Smallholders in North Kivu tend to devote their largest fields to their staple crops - most 
commonly a combination of beans, maize and cassava - and these fields are often far from the 
family home. Maize, in particular, is easily harvested and ready for consumption, while beans are 
the most widespread basic protein source in the region and are ready for cooking at harvest. Two 
general categories of cassava—‘sweet’ cassava and ‘bitter’ cassava, with varying cyanide 
content—are grown in the region, usually planted together in the same fields. For the rural 
population the differences between varieties of this staple crop are common knowledge, so 
‘sweet’ cassava is a ready target for foragers and thieves while ‘bitter’ cassava, with dangerous 
levels of cyanide and requiring substantial processing (soaking, fermentation, drying, etc.) before 
consumption, is largely ignored by thieves and foragers.11 
 
Peas in North Kivu are prepared in a manner similar to beans, where they are boiled (either fresh 
or dried), seasoned with oil and salt and served with a carbohydrate such as maize, cassava, taro 
or rice. They are seen as a rather ‘particular’ crop, susceptible to both insects and disease, so 
farmers in the region prefer to plant less and watch the crop closely, leading them to plant the 
crop in smaller fields close to home. In the presence of conflict, when farmers face greater risk 
visiting outlying fields, peas planted in fields closer to the home have the potential to take the 
place of extensive (and risky) bean production as the household’s primary protein source. In 
addition, peas in the high-altitude areas of eastern Lubero are harvested fresh to minimize the 
risk of insect damage, then sold fresh or dried, so the period from planting to harvest is less than 
four months, while beans in the same area are harvested after 4–5 months. 
 
Like ‘bitter’ cassava, taro root contains toxins which require considerable processing (usually 
peeling and sun-drying) before the root can be consumed safely. In addition, taro is traditionally 
cultivated on more marginal fields, so farmers who resort to cultivating closer to home in smaller 
patches of more difficult terrain may choose taro as a culturally appropriate option. 
 
As a small-seeded grain, millet requires considerable investment in drying, threshing and winnowing 
the harvested crop before it can be consumed, all of which would tend to dissuade potential thieves 
from the effort of stealing the crop from the field. In addition, millet is an uncommon staple crop in 
                                                          
11 Unfortunately the survey did not differentiate between ‘sweet’ and ‘bitter’ cassava when measuring cultivation 
and theft. 
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the diet of the region, so unfamiliarity with cooking and preparing the grain could be an additional 
impediment to its theft.12 
 
Considering these agronomic and cultural factors, a shift away from easily-prepared and readily-
consumed crops such as maize, beans and ‘sweet’ cassava, and toward millet, taro and peas make 
sense. As noted in Table 11, though rates of theft are higher in sub-region 12 even for taro and 
peas, those rates are substantially lower than the rates of theft for the primary staple crops 
mentioned. In this natural experiment, we see that farmers in areas exposed to higher-than-
average rates of conflict act as rational actors: They choose to switch away from conflict-prone 
staple crops and to diversify their portfolio with crops which are more conflict-resistant. 
 
Results– Part II 
 
Table 12. Regression estimations on the relationship between cropping system choice and conflict 
Dependent Variable Conflict Resistant  
Food Crops 
Conflict Resistant  
Cash Crops 
Crop  
Diversification 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Conflict Level 0.156*** 0.13*** 0.07*** 0.08*** 0.47*** 0.44*** 
Low Market Access   -0.299*** -0.08 -0.26*** -0.10* -1.48*** -0.82*** 
Contract with Farmer -0.406*** -0.19** 0.01 0.01 -1.3*** -0.63** 
Empowerment -0.706*** -0.90*** -0.11 -0.06 -1.99*** -2.0*** 
Social Cohesion 0.0950 0.08 0.10 0.12** 0.30* 0.37** 
Cooperative Membership 0.196 -0.06 -0.16*** -0.10* 0.14 0.86* 
Household Size 0.478 0.08 0.01 -0.01 0.1*** 0.14*** 
Income -3.93-10 -1.10-.09 -1.2-.09 1.69-.09 8.03-.09 1.33-.08 
Education 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01  -0.01 0.01 
Access to Technology 0.280 0.16** 0.22** 0.08 0.78 0.40** 
Constant 2.816 1.7*** 0.70*** 0.69 5.3*** 4.49*** 
Observations 1440 1440 1440 1440 1440 1440 
R-squared .2 .3 .15 .35 .25 .45 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Groupement FEs No Yes No Yes No Yes 
 Note.*Refers to 10% significance level while ** and *** refer to significance levels of 5 and 1 percent, respectively.  
 
                                                          
12 These findings substantially corroborate those reported by Rockmore (2014), who also found that in areas with rebel 
activity, fewer households choose to cultivate cassava, beans and maize, while more households cultivate millet. 
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The first two columns of Table 12 refer to conflict resistant food crops as the dependent variable 
with and without the groupement-specific effects. Table 13 lists and describes all correlates used 
in the analysis. In both the columns, we find conflict incidence positively affecting households’ 
cropping choices at the 99% confidence level. Households that have lower market access have a 
statistically significant negative association with producing less conflict resistant food crops. 
Contract levels of farmers are found to be negatively related to households’ choice of conflict 
resistant crops with 1% statistical significance: Farmers have more incentive to produce profit 
maximizing crops as opposed to hedging against conflict if they have an existing contract and 
will be producing more cash crops. 
 
Table 13. Regression variables 
 
Empowerment also appears negatively and significantly related to conflict resistant food crops in 
both columns. As a household gains more power in the society, it appears that households get 
more confident and produce less conflict resistant crops. Income, education, size and co-
operative memberships do not appear to be statistically significant with any of the conflict 
resistant food crops. Columns 3 and 4 show the estimates of conflict resistant cash crops as 
dependent variables with and without groupement fixed effects. Similar to conflict resistant food 
crops we find that conflict incidences are positively related at 1% significance levels. Low 
market access also depicts comparable results with the first two columns. Surprisingly, contracts 
with buyers do not have any statistical significance in the choice of conflict resistant cash crops. 
We attribute this non-significance to the lack of variation in the data as most of the farmers who 
produced cash crops have some kind of contract with buyers. Empowerment had similar effects 
because most farmers who practiced cash cropping had some influence on their respective 
Variable Name  Description  
Conflict Resistant Food Crops Crops which are both cultivated by the farmer as food crops for 
home consumption and reported as infrequently stolen 
Conflict Resistant Cash Crops Crops which are both cultivated by the farmer as cash crops and 
reported as infrequently stolen 
Crop Diversity  Number of crops each farmer produced 
Conflict Level Number of incidences of conflict each farmer experienced 
Low Market Access From a composite score of farmer’s access to local markets 
Contract with Farmers If the farmer had a formal contract with a buyer 
Empowerment Composite score on farmer’s voice and influence in his/her village 
Social Cohesion  Composite score of farmer’s social standing   
Co-operative Membership If the farmer is a member of a co-operative 
Household Size Number of people in the household 
Income  Total income in the last two cropping seasons 
Education  Number of years of schooling 
Access to technology Composite score on farmers’ access to agricultural technology 
Groupement   The specific groupement in which the farmer is located 
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councils and societies. We again fail to find any significant relationship between conflict 
resistant cash crop and household size, income and education.  
 
Columns 5 and 6 show the estimates of crop diversification. Conflict incidences are again found 
to be statistically significant and positively related to crop diversification at 99% confidence 
intervals. Contracts and low market access are negatively but statistically significantly related to 
crop diversification at a 1% significance level. Farmers who have contracts with buyers and low 
market access try to specialize in certain crops. Empowerment has a statistically significant 
negative relationship while social cohesion has a significant and positive association with crop 
diversification. Household size contradicts the results of previous columns showing a significant 
positive relationship with crop diversification. Surprisingly yet consistently, income and 
education appear inconsequential in terms of households’ choice of diversifying agricultural 
crops—possibly because while it is generally accepted that higher-educated farmers tend to 
specialize and invest more in fewer crops, under conditions of conflict those same farmers may 
tend to diversify their cropping choices. 
 
Using Propensity Score Matching, the impact of conflict on farmers’ cropping choice remains 
significant at the 5% level under the nearest neighbor regression method, and at the 1% level 
under the other methods (caliper=0.005 and kernel) (see Table 14). Figure 1 shows that the 
density curve for propensity scores of the treated and the control groups align well. Table 15 
details the variables used in the PSM estimation. 
 
Table 14. PSM estimations on the relationship between cropping system choice and conflict 
Estimation Method Nearest Neighbor Caliper (0.005) Kernel 
Coefficient on outcome variable 
(‘Conflict resistant crops’) 
0.076** 0.083*** 0.085*** 
Number of treated 879 879 879 
Number of controls 945 945 945 
Note. ** Refers to 5% significance level while *** refers to 1% significance level.  
 
 
Figure 1. Estimated propensity score density over groups (treated vs. control)  
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Table 15. PSM regression variables 
Variable Name  Description  
Conflict Resistant Crops Defined on the basis of the cropping system identified in the case 
study results, as the cultivation of at least one of millet, taro or peas 
in the previous cropping period. 
Treatment Variable  
Conflict Farmer reports exposure to conflict during the six months preceding 
the survey. 
Control Variables  
Low Market Access From a composite score of farmer’s access to local markets 
Contract with Farmers If the farmer had a formal contract with a buyer 
Empowerment Composite score on farmer’s voice and influence in his village 
Social Cohesion  Composite score of farmer’s social standing  
Co-operative Membership If the farmer is a member of a co-operative 
Education  Years of schooling of the most highly educated family member 
Access to technology Composite score on farmers’ access to agricultural technology 
Sub-Region   The sub-region in which the farmer is located. 
 
Discussion  
 
In Part I, we see that in a ‘natural experiment’ where rebel forces enter a sub-region of a 
relatively homogenous territory, increased rebel activity is associated with increases in 
community-level conflict, and that both are associated with increased incidence of crop theft. We 
also see evidence in the case study that when confronted by increased levels of conflict, farmers 
make the rational choice to cultivate less of the common, easily-looted maize, beans, and sweet 
cassava, and more conflict-resistant crops—characterized in this case by crops with a 
combination of a short, annual growth pattern, being cultivated in gardens or fields close to the 
home and/or close to population centers, and having extensive processing requirements 
(drying/threshing for millet, poison removal in the case of taro). The case study clearly indicates 
that households make rational choices about crop choice when faced with conflict, and choose to 
cultivate crops which are less prone to theft. 
 
In Part II, we find that the main independent correlate, conflict incidence, positively influences 
farmer cropping choice for both conflict-resistant cash and food crops and diversification 
decisions. Table 16 summarizes the signs of associated correlates used in the regression analysis. 
We conclude that being prone to conflict alters behavior and hedging mechanisms of farming 
households. Households in North Kivu tend to diversify their crop choice when exposed to 
conflict incidents. Access to technology appears to provide farmers an advantage in producing 
more conflict resistant crops, while better market access makes households more inclined to 
produce crops that are conflict resistant. Social empowerment also appears to have the same 
effect on conflict-resistant food cropping and crop diversification. However, empowerment and 
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contracts appear to have no effect on cash cropping, mainly due to lack of variation. Social 
cohesion does not affect the conflict-resistant food crop choices, though it affects the choice of 
cash crops and diversification—implying that better-connected farmers alter their cash-cropping 
behavior due to conflict, but not their cropping behavior for home consumption. A rather 
surprising finding of this research is that income and education levels do not affect farmer crop 
choices. We feel that the lack of dispersion in the data due to low-income levels and education 
across most of the surveyed households contributed to this significant yet perplexing discovery. 
It is also possible that the well-accepted tendency among higher-educated and higher-earning 
farmers to specialize in fewer crops confounds our analysis since those same farmers are likely 
to act rationally under conflict conditions. Access to farmer co-operatives only appears to reduce 
alteration in behavior in cash cropping. These findings are further corroborated by a Propensity 
Score Matching approach, demonstrating a strong case for a causal relationship between conflict 
incidence and the choice to cultivate a set of crops with strong conflict resistance.13 
 
These findings cannot necessarily be extrapolated to profit-oriented farming enterprises, given 
the subsistence nature of the majority of the sample studied—for example, just over 7% of the 
sample has any sort of contract with a buyer for the purchase of their crops. As noted previously, 
cropping decisions through much of North Kivu are “guided by the minimizing of risk rather 
than the maximizing of profits.” 
 
Table 16. Summary of results 
Explanatory / Dependent Food Crops Cash Crops Diversification 
Conflict + + + 
Market Access – – – 
Contract – N/A – 
Empowerment – N/A – 
Cohesion N/A + + 
Co-op N/A – N/A 
Income N/A N/A N/A 
Size N/A N/A + 
Technology + + + 
Education N/A N/A N/A 
Note. + Refers to statistically significant positive relationship while refers to a statistically 
significant negative relationship. N/A implies no association due to lack of statistical significance.  
 
                                                          
13 Issues of reverse causality are extremely unlikely in this case: A causal relationship between the cultivation of 
millet, taro and peas, and the incidence of rebel activity, would be difficult to substantiate.  
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Conclusion 
 
Although the study of cropping behavior under extreme conditions is in its infancy, our unique 
approach and results provide significant insight into farmer behaviors in North Kivu, DRC. The 
case study using the natural experiment in Sub-Region 12 of Lubero territory lends support to 
our primary hypothesis, that conflict changes farmer perceptions and cropping behavior. Our 
secondary results imply that farmers that have better market access will be able to adapt more 
towards conflict resistant cropping systems. Cohesion in general also increased shock resiliency 
through adaptation towards more conflict resilient cropping systems. Although household size 
increased crop diversification, it did not contribute to coping mechanisms through cropping 
systems. The policy implications that can be drawn from this study are that improving access to 
markets and information as well as increasing social cohesion can help farming households in 
conflict-prone agrarian societies such as North Kivu to adopt conflict-resistant farming practices. 
This, in turn, might help them to cope better with the adverse effects of long-term conflict and 
social unrest that has become an integral part of their lives and livelihoods. Finally, a better 
understanding of farmers’ cropping choices under conditions of conflict could aid practitioners, 
policymakers, and potentially even crop breeders and other researchers to better serve the needs 
of populations under conditions of long-term conflict. 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
We would like to thank the Howard G. Buffett Foundation for their financial support and Mr. 
Robert Kahumula, Mr. Vutseme Lusenge and Ms. Clarice Kivuya for adding nuance to our 
understanding of the qualitative components of farmer decision-making under conditions of 
conflict. We also thank the journal editors and three anonymous referees for their comments and 
contributions.  Any errors or limitations remain our own. 
 
References 
 
Abadie, A., and G. W. Imbens. 2009. Matching on the estimated propensity score (Working 
Paper No. 15301). National Bureau of Economic Research, Harvard University. 
 
Barnett, J., and W. N. Adger. 2007. Climate change, human security and violent 
conflict. Political Geography 26(6):639–655. doi: 10.1016/j.polgeo.2007.03.003. 
 
Dehejia, R. H., and S. Wahba.  1999. Causal effects in nonexperimental studies: Reevaluating 
the evaluation of training programs. Journal of the American Statistical Association 
94(448):1053–1062. 
 
Dehejia, R. H., and S. Wahba. 2002. Propensity score-matching methods for nonexperimental 
causal studies. Review of Economics and Statistics 84(1): 151–161. 
 
Dercon, S. 1996. Risk, crop choice, and savings: Evidence from Tanzania. Economic 
Development and Cultural Change 44(3):485–513. 
 
Kibriya et al.                                                                                                                              Volume 19 Issue 3, 2016 
 2016 International Food and Agribusiness Management Association (IFAMA). All rights reserved. 117 
Hill, C. M. 2000. Conflict of interest between people and baboons: crop raiding in 
Uganda. International Journal of Primatology 21(2): 299–315. doi:10.1023/A:1005 
481605637. 
 
Hochschild, A. 1999. King Leopold's Ghost: A Story of Greed, Terror, and Heroism in Colonial 
Africa. Houghton Mifflin Harcourt.  
 
Imbens, G. W. 2015. Matching Methods in Practice: Three Examples. Journal of Human 
Resources 50(2): 373–419. 
 
Gillingham, S., and  P. C. Lee. 2003. People and protected areas: a study of local perceptions of 
wildlife crop-damage conflict in an area bordering the Selous Game Reserve, 
Tanzania. Oryx 37(3):316–325. 
 
Kibriya, S., E. C. Price, J. N. King and V. Partida. 2014. Conflict Resistant Agribusiness in 
Democratic Republic of the Congo. International Food and Agribusiness Management 
Review 17(B):75–80. 
 
King, J. N., G. Finnegan, G. Savio, and E. C. Price. 2013. Conflict resistant crops: Identifying 
crops and cropping systems for targeted agricultural Development in North Kivu, 
Democratic Republic of the Congo. Paper presented at 30th annual conference of  the 
Association for International Agricultural Extension and Education Conference. Miami, 
Florida. April 27–May 1. 
Price, E. C., J. N.  King, and  S.  Kibriya. 2014. Building agriculture value chains in conflict 
prone environments: Iraq and Democratic Republic of Congo. Paper presented at 11th 
Wageningen International Conference on Chain and Network Management. Naples, Italy. 
June 4–6. 
 
Raeymaekers, T. 2008. Conflict and food security in Beni-Lubero: back to the future? Alinovi, 
Hemrich y Russo (2008) 169–95. 
 
Rockmore, M. 2014. Conflict and Agricultural Portfolios: Evidence from Northern Uganda. 
Center for Effective Global Action (CEGA). http://cega.berkeley.edu/assets/ 
miscellaneous_files/45-ABCA_-Conflict_and_Agricultural_Portfolios.pdf. 
 
Rosenbaum, P. R., and D. B. Rubin. 1983. The central role of the propensity score in 
observational studies for causal effects. Biometrika 70(1): 41–55. 
 
Stearns, J. 2012. Dancing in the Glory of Monsters: The Collapse of the Congo and the Great 
War of Africa. New York, NY: Public Affairs. 
 
Van Damme, S. 2012. Commodities of War: Communities speak out on the true cost of conflict 
in eastern DRC (164 Oxfam Briefing Paper). Oxfam International.  
 
Kibriya et al.                                                                                                                              Volume 19 Issue 3, 2016 
 2016 International Food and Agribusiness Management Association (IFAMA). All rights reserved. 118 
Vlassenroot, K. and T. Raeymaekers. 2008. Crisis and food security profile: The Democratic 
Republic of the Congo. In Beyond Relief, edited by Luca Alinovi, Günter Hemrich, and 
Luca Russo, 47–64. Practical Action Publishing, 
 
Vlassenroot, K. 2008. Land tenure, conflict and household, strategies in the eastern Democratic 
Republic of the Congo. In Beyond relief: Food Security in Protracted Crises. Edited by 
L. Alinovi, G. Hemrich  and L. Russo. Chapter 10: 216–274.  FAO and Practical Action 
Publishing, Rugby, UK. 
 
Zilverberg, C. 2007. Agriculture, Technology and Conflict. Unpublished MS Thesis. Texas 
A&M University, USA. 
 
 
